## SBOM & Attestations

New and Emerging Requirements for Software Vendors





## Introductions







Evan Cole Solutions Engineer

## Software Supply Chain Attacks

Poll: What do you currently do to secure your software supply chain?

- Check for vulnerabilities (CVEs)
- Consume individually signed software artifacts
- Use 3rd party solutions (SCA, SAST, DAST, etc.)
- Nothing yet, exploring options

## Securing the software supply chain requires more than just managing vulnerabilities (CVEs)

## Next Gen Supply Chain Threats



Source: <u>SLSA.dev</u>

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## 430% YoY growth in **<u>Next Gen</u>** Supply Chain Threats



## Industry Examples

- Compiler attacks
- Target
- Stuxnet
- ATM malware
- NotPetya / M.E.Doc
- British Airways

- SolarWinds
- Microsoft Exchange Server
- Golden SAML
- Ransomware attacks

## Poll: Results

The Response

BRIEFING ROOM

## Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity

MAY 12, 2021 • PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private sector, and ultimately the American people's security and privacy. The Federal Government must improve its efforts to identify, deter, protect against, detect, and respond to these actions and actors. The Federal Government must also carefully examine what occurred during any major cyber incident and apply lessons learned. But cybersecurity requires more than government action. Protecting our Nation from malicious cyber actors requires the Federal Government to partner with the private sector. The private sector must adapt to the continuously changing threat environment, ensure its products are built and operate securely, and partner with the Federal Government to foster a more secure cyberspace. In the end, the trust we place in our digital infrastructure should be proportional to how trustworthy and transparent that infrastructure is, and to the consequences we will incur if that trust is misplaced.

#### What is SLSA?

#### ActiveState

Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, or SLSA (salsa). It's a security framework, a check-list of standards and controls to prevent tampering, improve integrity, and secure packages and infrastructure in your projects, businesses or enterprises. It's how you get from safe enough to being as resilient as possible, at any link in the chain.

## The supply chain problem

Any software can introduce vulnerabilities into a supply chain. As a system gets more complex, it's critical to already have checks and best practices in place to guarantee artifact integrity, that the source code you're relying on is the code you're actually using. Without solid foundations and a plan for the system as it grows, it's difficult to focus your efforts against tomorrow's next hack, breach or compromise.

More about supply chain attacks



## The Dependency Problem

## Open Source Dependencies

```
pytest 6.2.2 pytest: simple powerful testing with Python
atomicwrites >=1.0
attrs >=19.2.0
colorana *
iniconfig *
packaging *
_____pyparsing >=2.0.2
pluggy >=0.12,<1.0.0al
py >=1.8.2
toml *
requests 2.25.1 Python HTTP for Humans.
certifi >=2017.4.17
chardet >=3.0.2,<5
idma >=2.6,<3
urllib3 >=1.21.1,<1.27</pre>
```

- Open source components make up >75% of the code in the average app.
- The average app depends on more than 500 components.

VentureBeat Research

## Dependency Threats



Source: <u>SLSA.dev</u>

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## Open Source Dependency Vendors

## meta::cpan

## **ActiveState**





# Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs)

## Poll: What is your current experience with SBOMs?

- Checking for vulnerabilities (CVEs)
- Reviewing transitive dependencies
- Supplying to customers for regulatory purposes
- Reviewing open source license utilization
- Reviewing the age of my dependencies
- None of the above

SBOMs - Listing of all the component parts that make up your software



## Elements of an SBOM

#### The Essentials

- Defines the open source libraries/packages/extensions used
- First party (in house code) used
- Versioning , licensing status

Other Aspects:

- Vulnerability information
- External services
- Component checksums (ex SHA-256 hash)
- The entire thing is signed by the provider

## SBOM Formats

Government Approved Formats (NIST)

- Software Package Data Exchange
- CycloneDX
- SWID

#### Common in Industry

CSV



What do you use an SBOM for?

- **Visibility** into all the components that make up a software application.
- **Operational capacity** to resolve vulnerabilities and manage component life cycles (EOL)
- Automate: Run the SBOM through a tool (ex. Daggerboard, spdx-to-osv, dependency track) to identify vulnerabilities
- **Provide** as a requirement of regulation to your customers or auditor
- **Request** as a requirement from your software vendors for pre-purchase assurance

## Poll: Results

## Platform Demo - SBOM

## You can do this with a free account today

Documentation: <a href="https://docs.activestate.com/platform/projects/sbom/">https://docs.activestate.com/platform/projects/sbom/</a>

#### Project



#### **JSON Format**

C 🔒 platform.activestate.com/sv/mediator/?\_ga=2.180857959.1582352770.1668441394-132845242.1652072644&query=%7B%0A%20%20sbom(org%... 🖞 🛠 💽 🍁 🖬 🐝 🗄 urces 🚯 Product Developm... 👶 • UX Nurture - A... 🚍 Nicole - Onboardi... 📅 ActiveHub - Traini... 💠 [MPB-113] Test ho... 💠 [DS-643] Messagi... 💠 [MPB-115] Add St... 😰 Gong | Home »



#### **SPDX** Format

SPDXVersion: SPDX-2.2 DataLicense: CC0–1.0 SPDXID: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT DocumentName: APEE-534-Microsoft-Rlc-NoPMC-Athnticode DocumentNamespace: https://platform.activestate.com/download/spdx/ActiveStateBE/APEE-534-Microsoft-Rlc-NoPMC-Athntico de/e73ad540-0072-4d50-845a-03844c0a74fe Creator: Organization: ActiveState Created: 2022-06-02T22:31:01Z PackageName: perl SPDXID: SPDXRef-perl PackageVersion: 5.34.0 PackageDownloadLocation: https://dl.activestate.com/source/ed4b2154-eaee-5fba-88bb-d1eca86b1206/versions/0fbbfdd6-68e 5-5f06-86ce-b03395e79c54/revisions/5/per1-5.34.0.tar.gz FilesAnalvzed: false PackageChecksum: SHA256: 551efc818b968b05216024fb0b727ef2ad4c100f8cb6b43fab615fa78ae5be9a PackageLicenseConcluded: GPL-1.0-or-later PackageLicenseConcluded: Artistic-1.0-Perl PackageLicenseDeclared: NOASSERTION PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: GPL-1.0-or-later PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: Artistic-1.0-Perl PackageCopyrightText: NOASSERTION PackageName: ActiveState-Utils SPDXID: SPDXRef-ActiveState-Utils PackageVersion: 2.11 PackageDownloadLocation: https://dl.activestate.com/source/b53f2bdf-e7f8-57fb-ab05-171e637b4061/versions/8e6d4291-e6b c-5bd3-b401-438737249669/revisions/5/main.tar.gz FilesAnalyzed: false PackageChecksum: SHA256: 18bc5314cf40fb093f9e26eb12d268cd9a51a928b14c0a30fbd7f9e3577fbef1 PackageLicenseConcluded: NOASSERTION PackageLicenseDeclared: NOASSERTION PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: NOASSERTION PackageCopyrightText: NOASSERTION PackageName: ActiveState-YAML SPDXID: SPDXRef-ActiveState-YAML PackageVersion: 0.36 PackageDownloadLocation: https://dl.activestate.com/source/ae1a4d58-b08c-5dad-8afa-40be0e46210d/versions/85f3b8c6-a65 f-500a-beda-7966b9cc5344/revisions/5/main.tar.gz FilesAnalyzed: false

PackageChecksum: SHA256: 017e263ad6856397b7a445e5c6cb4746815bab15eca44fdc7f064b020cf07f43

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Attestations (SLSA)

Poll: What is your current experience with software attestations?

- Heard of them
- Heard of them in relation to US regulatory requirements
- Looking into using or generating them
- Looking into them as part of meeting SLSA framework
- Haven't heard of them

## Artifacts and Attestations

- Artifact Any digital asset which forms part of a software supply chain.
   Source code, build scripts, installable binaries.
- Attestation A statement about the provenance of an Artifact. Who created it, how, when and with what.
- In-toto ITE-6 The recommended format for attestations.
- Non-Falsifiable SLSA levels 3 and above

## Dependency Threats



Source: <u>SLSA.dev</u>

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## SLSA - Addressing Supply Chain Security

- SLSA Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (<u>https://slsa.dev/</u>).
- OSSF Initiative Operates under OSSF umbrella
- Industry Backed Google, ChainGuard, Linux Foundation
- Multiple Levels Levels providing increasing assurance.
  - 1 Documentation of the build process
  - 2 Tamper resistance of the build service
  - 3 Extra resistance to specific threats
  - 4 Highest levels of confidence and trust

## Secure Build Service

Requirement	SLSA 1	SLSA 2	SLSA 3	SLSA 4
Build - Scripted build	~	~	~	~
Build - Build service		~	~	~
Build - Build as code			~	~
Build - Ephemeral environment			~	~
Build - Isolated			~	~
Build - Parameterless				~
Build - Hermetic				~
Build - Reproducible				0

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## Dependency Vendoring Comparison

	Prebuilt?	Secure?	Up to Date?	Time & Resources
Public Repo (PyPl, npm, etc)	Yes	No	Yes	Low
Build It Yourself	No	Yes	Yes	High
ActiveState Platform	No	Yes	Yes	Low

## Poll: Results



## Platform Demo - Attestations



## Demo: Attestation

#### intoto — Attestation Document — -zsh — 129×42

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....
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	🖲 😑 🌑 👘 nicoleschwartz — @64dbebc12e9b:/ — com.docker.cli < docker run -it docker-registry.activestate.build/activestate/slsa-demo-validator:1.0 — 125×39
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## Why are we doing this?

- All critical software that touches government data or systems in any way must be compliant with these new security standards no later than June 12, 2023, 7 months from now.
- And all software must adhere to these strict standards no later than September 14, 2023, 10 months from now.

For which you need:

- Software producer self-attestation (can use in-toto)
- SBOM

## ActiveState Platform





## Next Steps

Schedule a demo with our product experts: <a href="https://www.activestate.com/get-demo/">https://www.activestate.com/get-demo/</a>

Learn more about software attestations: <u>https://www.activestate.com/solutions/attestations/</u>

Learn more about Supply Chain Security: <a href="https://www.activestate.com/solutions/slsa">https://www.activestate.com/solutions/slsa</a>

Try the ActiveState Platform for free: <u>https://platform.activestate.com/</u>